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What Effects Do Privatisation Policies Have on Corporate Governance of State-
Owned Enterprises? Munawarah1, Muhammad Din2, Fatlina Zainuddin3,
Harjum Muharam4 Abstract: This study attempts to test the effect of state
ownership and follow-up of audit findings in state-owned enterprises (SOEs)
owned by the government of the Republic of Indonesia, on the good corporate
governance of SOEs. By using Ordinary Least Square (OLS) analysis, conducted
by observing 98 observations during 2010-2014, the findings show that there
are negative relationship between state ownership and good corporate
governance implementation in SOEs in Indonesia. In addition, the results also
reveal that the follow-up of audit findings positively affect the implementation
of governance. Keywords: Good Corporate Governance, State ownership,
privatization, audit findings, State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) JEL Classification:
G31, G34, G38, L33, M42 1Ph.D Student in Management at Faculty of
Economics and Business, Diponegoro University, e-mail:
munawarah1980@untad.ac.id 2Faculty of Economics and Business, Tadulako
University, e-mail: muhammaddin@untad.ac.id 3Ph .D Student in the Faculty
of Economics and Business, Tadulako University, e-mail: fatlina.z@gmail.com
4Faculty of Economics and Business, Diponegoro University, e-mail:
hardjum@gmail.com 1. Introduction The performance of state enterprises in
Indonesia generally has not provided an optimum contribution to the national
economic growth and government annual revenue, primarily caused by the
inadequacy of the implementation of Good Corporate Governance (GCG).
Basically, Good Corporate Governance (GCG) is considered not only as a
formality, but also as a system which is able to influence the value of company.
The impetus for good corporate governance is very demanded for many
Southeast Asian countries that experience overwhelmingly monetary crisis in
the late 1990s, caused mainly by a weak implementation of corporate
governance in public sector, monetary institutions and private companies. A
research conducted by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) identifies that the
lack of corporate governance, particularly in Indonesia, was the main
contributors of that crisis (Zhuang, De Dios, and Martin, 2000). Unlike previous
studies arguably focusing more on the implementation of Good Corporate
Governance as a means to improve the performance of private business
(Chiang He & Lai, 2012; Colarossi et al., 2008) and government-owned
enterprises, especially in developing countries (Colley et al. 2003; Zeitun,
2009; Babatunde & Olaniran, 2009), this study aims to analyze the effect of
state ownership and the follow-up of the results of financial investigation on
the implementation of GCG of State-Owned Enterprises in Indonesia. This
study basically aims to provide the broader scope of analysis from previous
study of Munawarah et al, (2017), by examining the role of follow-up of audit
findings on the GCG practice in SOEs. Thus, there are two contributions of this
study compared to previous studies, that are the need for privatization in
enhancing the credibility of business management of SOEs; and the role of
follow-up of audit findings in improving the effectiveness of corporate
governance. 2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development The
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (2005) states that
SOEs are an important part of gross domestic product, employment and market
capitalization of a country, especially with the acquisition of such strategic
industrial infrastructure as energy, transportation and telecommunications.
Moreover, the performance of SOEs has a broader segmentation as they can
affect other business sectors. The development of an increasingly competitive
global market, a more rapid technological advance and the deregulation of
monopolistic markets have by far become the fundamental needs of the
adjustments and restructuring of SOEs, including their privatization by stock
offerings in the capital markets. Claessens et al. (2002) showed that the state
as the controller is very concerned to increase the value of state-owned
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companies by exploiting SOEs to generate large dividend to increase the state
revenue. On the other hand, a very large controlling right by the state will also
be able to lead to further decline in the company value and the potential
occurrence of the expropriation of the minority shareholders. Therefore, it is
necessary, regarding the existence of GCG as a set of rules, to regulate the
activity of SOEs management to ensure the ongoing creation of the general
welfare. In addition, GCG is expected to avoid a gap between the principal and
the agent of government roles. Therefore, the implementation of Good
Corporate Governance is highly demanded to limit the government roles and
political interference, and to regulate the state ownership to create a common
interest as stipulated in the basic guidelines for the implementation of GCG of
SOEs (OECD, 2005; Ivanova and Bikeeva, 2016). In addition, as a basic means
to protect the right of minority shareholders from mastery or appropriation of
rights by managers and government as the controlling shareholder of SOEs,
GCG practice is perceived to be able to minimize any opportunistic behaviour
(Mitton, 2002; Savina, 2016; Menshchikova and Sayapin, 2016; Baldacchino et
al., 2017; Toudas and Bellas, 2014; El-Chaarani, 2017). The application of GCG
in SOEs could reduce any behaviour possibly arising from government
ownership. This, in turn, can help increase the company’s performance and
value. Moreover, the role of the legislative council as a watchdog over financial
management and the performance of SOEs is needed to create an effective
implementation of Good Corporate Governance. Kusumawardhani (2012) finds
a positive influence of legislative oversight, as measured by the number of
parliament members in the Board of Commissioners, on the financial
performance of local government. It means that a greater number of legislature
will lead to a more effective supervisory function, that eventually results in a
higher government financial performance. H1: State ownership has negative
effect on the implementation of Good Corporate Governance. Auditing is one of
the institutional responsibilities of both public and private businesses
concerned mainly for pointing out the errors in financial account. The result of
the audit findings will be very helpful in creating accountability in financial
management (Setyaningrum et al., 2014; Pociovalisteanu and Thalassinos,
2008; Giannakopoulou et al., 2016). For managers of state finances, partially
in Indonesia, the obligation to follow up the result of the audit report, as
stipulated in Law No. 15/2004, is the responsibility of the entity or auditee. In
fact, however, from 2008 until 2012 only few recommendations (55%) of the
report were followed up in accordance with the recommendations of the
bureau, while the remaining of 45% was followed up not in accordance with the
recommendations, that were eventually put in the category of non-actionable
(IHPS BPK RI, 2013). Lin and Liu (2012) state that although the detection of
irregularities is an important part of auditing, it is just the first step before
others which are more important, namely asking responsibility and making
corrections. Therefore, high-quality auditors are expected to be able to
generate appropriate recommendations which are relatively easily implemented
in accordance with the company conditions. This, in turn, leads to a higher and
more effective follow-up of audit recommendations. Claessens and Yurtoglu
(2012) find that the level of state ownership and the diversity of corporate
governance applied in each country are influenced by the economic diversity
and financial conditions, institutional environment and structures, and group
affiliates and investors. Bhagat and Bolton (2008) find that the SOEs
performance is influenced by corporate governance, capital structure and
ownership structure. Xu and Wang (1999), Qiang (2003), Ang and Ding (2006)
reveal that the SOEs governance structure is strongly influenced by the level of
state ownership. Hence, although the ownership structure of a country is
perceived to be able to have a direct impact on performance, there is a role of
corporate governance in mediating this effect. Nguyen and Van Dijk (2012)
demonstrate that the corporate governance of SOEs may reduce the level of
corruption and negatively impact on corruption. Hence, the audit findings have 
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an important role in highlighting the potential cases of corruption and
mismanagement in the SOEs. Thus, the process of auditing is likely to be able
to improve the good corporate governance of SOEs. This means that the
auditing results are an effective means for the implementation of good
corporate governance. Efendy (2010) notes that the audit recommendations
should be followed by any related institutions to keep auditor motivation in
pointing the fraud that occur. Improving the effectiveness of the
recommendation is one of the strategic objectives apparently outlined in the
business performance indicators. For auditors, audit finding recommendations
and implementations determine the effectiveness of their functions and roles to
encourage the quality of public sector management and state finance
(Setyaningrum et al., 2014). Additionally, Rongbing and Yuetang (2010) argue
that the correction or improvement efforts made by the audit institutions and
associated parties in China related to the findings are the most important
factors in determining the extent to which auditing bodies can perform
transparency and promote accountability of the public sector and private
company. H2: There is a positive relationship between the follow-up of auditing
findings and implementation of Good Corporate Governance. 3. Methodology
3.1 Sampling Method This study was conducted by observing the data from the
period 2010-2014, by usingg purposive judgment sampling method. The SOEs
were selected as sample based on several requirements. Among them, the
companies must have the data on the number of auditing report follow-up
during the observation period, and were listed the value of the evaluation
assessment on the application of GCG based on the Decree of the Ministry of
State Enterprises No.SK-16/S.MBU/2012 or the Circular of the Ministry of State
Enterprises No.S-168/MBU/2008. Moreover, the companies must have
proprietary data of government and non-government ownership share on
enterprises, and have a complete data related to all variables examined during
the observation period. After several selection processes, the amount of sample
was 98 SOEs, consisted of 28 observations of public companies and 70
observations of unpublic companies. Among them, 17 companies was taken
from 2010 data, 23 from 2011, 22 from 2012, 27 from 2013, and 9 from 2014.
Majority of sample was from transportion and warehousing industry with 32
observations (32.65%), followed by finance and insurance with 16 observations
(16.33%), mining with 16 observations (12.24%), and manufacture with 10
observations (10.20%). Empirical Model and Measurement of Variables To
assess the proposed model, the following formula of ordinary least-square was
used: GCG it = β 0 + β 1 GOV it + β 2 AUD + ε 1 (1) in which the GCG is good
corporate governance measured by the scores on the assessment of GCG
implementation based on the regulation of the Minister of SOEs, on the
assessment conducted by either the state or independent parties. The
assessment of the implementation of GCG after 2012 used appropriate
parameters as specified by the Letter of Secretary of the Ministry of SOEs No 
.SK-16/S.MBU/2012 on the indicators and parameters of Assessment and
Evaluation of the Implementation of GCG in SOEs. As for the year 2011 and
earlier, this study used the Circular Letter of the Ministry of SOEs No.S- 168 
/MBU/ 2008 on the Implementation of GCG Practices in SOEs (Munawarah et
al, 2017: 956); AUD, is the follow-up of the recommendations of the bureau, as
measured by the percentage of the number of those having actually been
implemented by the particular enterprise in accordance with the
recommendation of the bureau compared to the total number of bureau
recommendations; GOV is the government ownership in SOEs, as measured by
the percentage of government ownership as compared to the total stocks. 4.
Results 4.1 Descriptive Statistics The results of descriptive statistics reveal that
privatized SOEs have a higher mean value in all the variables of the audit
findings and corporate governance than those in non-privatized ones. This
indicates that the bureau recommendation and GCG assessment scores for the
publicly listed SOEs are higher. Table 2. Statistic Description of Variables Items
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Mean Median Std. Dev Min Max Panel A: Overall Sample = 98 Observations
(firm-year) AUD 43.568 41.24 40.602 0 100 GOV 89.688 100 16.174 51 100
IDX 0.285 0 0.454 0 1 GCG 83.490 83.58 7.167 66.56 96.32 Panel B:
Privatized SOEs= 28 Observations (firm-year) AUD 56.893 66.186 42.213 0
100 GOV 65.76 65.01 8.554 51 85.81 GCG 87.169 86.725 5.919 75.68 96.32
Panel C: Unlisted SOEs = 70 Observations (firm-year) AUD 38.238 25.343
38.979 0 100 GOV 99.26 100 3.725 73.15 100 GCG 82.018 82.1 7.128 66.559
94.62 Source: data processed, 2016. Table 3. Test for Equality of means of AUD
and GCG categorized by values of IDX Variable Df Value Probability AUD test)
(Anova F- 41.24 40.602 100 GCG test) (Anova F- 100 16.174 100 Source: data
processed, 2016. 4.2 Hypothesis Testing H1 states that there is the effect of
state ownership on the SOEs’ corporate governance, while H2 states the effect
of follow-up of audit findings on SOEs’ corporate governance. The results show 
the effect of state ownership (GOV) and the follow-up of auditing reports (AUD)
on the implementation of Good Corporate Governance (GCG). Overall, the
independent variable of GCG can explain the variation by 18.53% percent. The
results also reveal that the state ownership has a significant negative effect on
the GCG with a negative coefficient of -.0125 at a significance level of 5
percent. This result indicates that hypothesis 1 is accepted, meaning that an
increase of state ownership in SOEs can decrease state ownership negatively of
GCG implementation. The testing also finds that the variable of following up the
auditing results has a positive and significant influence on the implementation 
of GCG with a coefficient of 0.049 at a significance level of 5 percent. This
means that the higher the following up of the auditing results, the higher the
effectiveness of the implementation of GCG in SOEs. Thus, hypothesis 2 is
accepted. Table 4. Hypothesis Testing Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-statistic
Prob. Constant 92.52061 4.001767 23.11994 0.0000 GOV -0.124511 0.041773
-2.980671 0.0037 AUD 0.049041 0.016640 2.947144 0.0040 R-square
0.185328 Adjusted square R- 0.168177 F-statistic 10.80564 Prob. (F-statistic)
0.000059 AUD, is the number of follow up on the recommendations of the
audit findings of the bureau, measured by the percentage of the number of
follow-up recommendations that has been implemented by the state in
accordance with the recommendation of the bureau compared to the total
number of the recommendations. GOV, is the government shareholding in
SOEs, measured by the percentage of government ownership as compared to
total stock. GCG, is good corporate governance, measured by scores on the
assessment of GCG implementation based on the regulation of Minister of
SOEs, either on its own assessment conducted by state-owned or assessment
by independent parties. Source: data processed, 2016. The testing results show
that state ownership influence SOEs’ governance. This result is consistent with
the studies of Munawarah et al. (2017), Xu and Wang (1999), Qiang (2003),
Bhagat and Bolton (2008), Nguyen and Van Dijk (2012). Lisic et al. (2014)
state that Chinese company largely owned by the state negatively affects the
fraud occur at the company. Moreover, the findings of Wahyuni (2011) show
that government ownership negatively affects the SOEs performance in
Indonesia. 5. Conclusion The results show that the state ownership has
negative effect on corporate governance in SOEs. This means that a lower level
of corporate governance is likely to lead to an increased audit findings. The
result also shows that the follow-up of recommendations of the bureau
positively affects the implementation of Good Corporate Governance,
highlighting the importance of following up the recommendations of the
bureau to advance the effectiveness of the implementation of GCG. Moreover,
the findings reveal that publicly listed SOEs have better auditing result and
higher implementation of GCG, significantly different with the non-listed
enterprises. The conclusions generally imply to reduce the potential audit
findings from the bureau and to reduce the level of state ownership by
privatization strategies. This study also has some limitations. Even though the
number of sample was achieved in accordance with the criteria proposed, it was
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still relatively small as it used only few number of Indonesia’s SOEs listed in the
IDX. In addition, the model has not considered the opportunistic behaviour
describing several characteristics of the company management and other
variables that can be considered as control variables. Hence, these two
considerations can be examined in further researches. References: Ammann,
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